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Abstract
If ever there was momentum to roll back the welfare state, it is the (aftermath) of the financial crisis
of 2008–09. All theoretical perspectives within comparative welfare state research predict radical
reform in this circumstance, but does it also happen? Our data indicate that – at least so far – it
does not. Focusing on a selection of advanced welfare states (the UK, the USA, Germany, the
Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden), we find that these countries face similar problems and that
their initial response to these problems is also similar. The latter is surprising because, theoretically,
we would expect varying responses across welfare state regime types. Rather than retrenchment, we
observe a first phase of emergency capital injections in the banking sector and a second of Keynesian
demand management and labour market protection, including the (temporary) expansion of social
programmes. Continuing public support for the welfare state was a main precondition for this lack
of immediate radical retrenchment. However, the contours of a third phase have become apparent
now that budgetary constraints are forcing political actors to make tough choices and introduce
austerity policies. As a result, the question of who pays what, when, and how will likely give rise
to increasingly sharp distributional conflicts.
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Are the financial crisis of 2008 and its economic aftershocks (Hemerijck et al.
2009) spurring major reform efforts in key social policy domains in Western
welfare states? It is interesting to note that in all mainstream approaches to
welfare state change, financial and economic crises play a theoretical role of
instigators of structural and radical reform (see e.g. Kuipers 2006: chapter 2
for an overview). The general thrust of the argumentation is that although
Address for correspondence: Dr Barbara Vis, Department of Political Science, VU University
Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1081, 1081 HV Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Email: b.vis@vu.nl
Social Policy & Administration issn 0144–5596
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9515.2011.00778.x
Vol. 45, No. 4, August 2011, pp. 338–353
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ , UK and
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
tremendous pressures for reform have been accumulating in the past
decades, these typically do not translate into drastic reform because of
the various institutional and political forces that work against them. A
crisis, in the sense of an indubitable threat of breakdown, is assumed to set
these forces free and bring about, more or less instantaneously, radical
reforms.
The institutionalist approach, for one, has a good toolbox to explain, for
‘normal times’, social policy continuity and what has been termed ‘progres-
sive change’, that is, the kind of change showing no brutal departure from a
developmental path but with a specific direction nonetheless (Palier 2010a:
31). But an institutionalist analysis would also suggest that a crisis offers a
critical juncture at which it is possible to divert from the original path of
development and embark upon substantial reform, including harsh retrench-
ment and major restructuring (Palier 2010b). A socio-economic account
would predict that socio-economic dire straits provide functional demands to
the political system that are likely to translate into drastic reform at the
moment they are perceived or felt as systemic or existential threats (see
Schwartz 2001 and Starke 2006 for overviews). Given the pressures exerted
by the financial crisis and its economic aftermath, such as rapidly rising levels
of unemployment and increasing budget deficits, this perspective predicts
radical retrenchment and recommodification almost as inescapable and
immediate outcomes.
An ideational account would point to the fact that ideas assume a trans-
formative capacity under extreme conditions. A crisis causes urgent uncer-
tainty and fosters the prompt take-up of groundbreaking and previously
unacceptable ideas to transform the welfare state radically and rapidly (see e.g.
Béland and Cox 2010; Stiller 2010).
Finally, even Iversen and Wren’s (1998) service sector trilemma approach
would predict a fast transformation of regime specific paths. Interestingly, and
contrary to Iversen and Wren’s prediction, the conservative regime did not
opt for a continuation of the welfare-without-work path, but has sacrificed,
like the social democratic regime, budgetary restraint. The liberal regime also
went in another direction than expected, by preventing income inequality
from rising more sharply and protecting employment at the expense of bud-
getary restraint.
The main theoretical perspectives converge around the anticipation that
the financial crisis in the short run and its economic aftershocks in the some-
what longer run open up an opportunity if not necessity for radical welfare
state reform. Can we (already) find empirical indications that support these
theoretical predictions? Is the financial crisis setting in motion a (radical)
restructuring of the welfare state and a programme of serious cutbacks in
social expenditures? In the next section, we argue that, so far, it is not. After
a first phase of supporting banks, a second one of mainly macroeconomic
policies followed, which upheld and expanded rather than retrenched welfare
programmes. We argue that the supportive public opinion on the core welfare
state programmes is an important precondition in this regard. In the third,
and ongoing, phase, cutbacks of social expenditures are entering the agenda,
but it remains to be seen how this will play out.
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Outline of the Argument and Structure of the Article
The financial crisis and its economic aftershocks are a moving target, making
studying their effects on social policy-making intricate. Still, we would like to
present an indicative overview of the measures taken so far in countries
selected from the different worlds of welfare: the UK, the USA, Germany, the
Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden. We select the UK, Germany and
Sweden because these countries are representative of the liberal, conservative
and social democratic welfare state regimes respectively (Esping-Andersen
1990). The Netherlands, conversely, is a typical ‘hybrid’ welfare state regime
(Vis et al. 2008), combining traits from both the social democratic and the
conservative regimes. Moreover, we include the USA because of its major role
in the financial crisis. Finally, we focus on Denmark because, arguably,
welfare state reform in this country has been groundbreaking in its solution to
the notorious efficiency–equality trade-off in the 1990s and 2000s, combining
active labour market policies with a high level of generosity in benefit levels
(Albæk et al. 2008).
Below we report that the theoretical predictions presented in the first
section cannot be supported, or at least not yet. Despite substantial cross-
national differences, the early responses to the crisis are by and large similar
everywhere. Governments did not immediately respond with cutbacks or
radical restructuring. On the contrary, the initial response of all governments
was to reserve or invest resources to support or bail out banks and, somewhat
later, industrial sectors. With a seemingly unprecedented level of international
coordination, all countries embarked upon a fairly classical Keynesian inter-
vention, first, to prevent the collapse of the banking sector and, second, to
prevent a massive drop in demand. In this first phase, the similarity in
response is what is most striking. In the second phase, it became rapidly clear
that in spite of the intervention the financial crisis was causing an economic
downturn that threatened to turn into a recession, with severe consequences
for labour market developments. Consequently, all countries expanded social
programmes or adjusted them to cushion the shock of the crisis and the
expected economic malaise. Again, there was much similarity in the responses
and most countries made an effort to prevent mass unemployment and to
ensure that redundant workers would retain their relation with the labour
market (e.g. through ‘part-time unemployment’).
The developments seem to be in line with the compensation hypothesis that
(financial) globalization (economic openness) and welfare effort are mutually
reinforcing (Glatzer and Rueschemeyer 2005). This conflicts with recent find-
ings supporting the efficiency hypothesis of a negative relationship between glo-
balization and social expenditures (Jahn 2006; Busemeyer 2009). Different
from the latter’s predictions, and in line with the compensation hypothesis,
we find that all countries initially chose to relax their budget restraint to
finance the collapsing banking sector, then introduced macroeconomic
support measures and finally also made an effort to defend social compensa-
tion and social investment strategies, albeit usually explicitly temporarily.
We are also already picking up the signs of a third phase in the response to
the financial crisis and its economic aftershocks. The Keynesian intervention
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and the following protective measures are a costly affair and they are causing
budget deficits to increase rapidly. It might be that the theoretical perspectives
will prove to be right in the end, that is if the crisis and the initial policy
responses turn out to have revolutionized the social and political foundation of
the welfare state consensus. Moreover, if the pessimistic (realistic?) economists
are right (e.g. Stiglitz 2010) and the world economy is not likely to recover
quickly, also precisely because governments discontinue demand manage-
ment, the cumulative effects of lower tax income and social security contri-
butions, continuing expensive financial support policies, and rising social
expenditures are likely to deteriorate the already dire budgetary condition of
the welfare states, adding to the pressure for drastic reform. Thus far,
however, we observe that the crisis has not had the instant effect of triggering
policies that harm core social programmes, but we do catch sight of the fact
that the issue of radical retrenchment is capturing the political agenda in
many a nation.
As indicated, we argue that one important precondition for the initial
similarity in policy responses is that the crisis did not undermine public
support for the welfare state’s core institutions and the role the institutions
play in mitigating the domestic impact of the whims of the global (financial)
markets. To illustrate the relevance of public opinion in the wake of the crisis,
on which ‘hard’ data that are comparable across countries are not available
(yet), we conduct a qualitative content analysis of national public debates in
print and online media.1 We discuss public support for the welfare state as an
important precondition for the emergence of similar responses in the third
section. The initial similarity in policy responses relates to the fact that coun-
tries are facing roughly similar problems. In the fourth section, we show that
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the USA have,
indeed, been facing comparable problems as a result of the financial crisis and
its aftershocks.
The aftershocks will likely be tangible for many years. During this time,
large differences between countries – as well as across political parties within
countries – are likely to re-emerge. Where, for example, to raise the money for
the risen budget deficits? Will this be in the form of higher taxes, possibly for
specific groups (à la Obama’s bank tax)? Or by cutting back on social expen-
ditures? To answer these questions, our qualitative content analysis of
national public debates in print and online media focuses also on how gov-
ernments deal with the aftershocks. This analysis reveals a keen and nervous
awareness of budgetary stress and commitment to cutbacks everywhere, but
also (so far) a conspicuous lack of concrete plans on how to achieve a balanced
budget in the (near) future (fifth section). The final section concludes.
Public Opinion and the Welfare State
A supportive public opinion is one of the major defensive mechanisms of the
welfare state against radical reforms and drastic cutbacks (e.g. Brooks and
Manza 2006a). Generally, the core programmes of the welfare state are
broadly cherished – except perhaps in the USA. More specifically, when
the framing of certain core social programmes triggers the so-called
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‘deservingness heuristic’ among the public, support for such programmes and
policies is automatic and even overrules prevailing values (Petersen et al. 2010).
The current crisis differs substantially from the crises of the 1970s and, espe-
cially, the 1980s. At those times, the ‘big’ (welfare) state was seen as one of the
primary causes of the crisis, crowding out money for investments and thereby
inhibiting economic and employment growth. In sharp contrast, public
opinion data now show that the public by and large does not blame the
welfare state for the current crisis. Instead it is viewed as a solution to (at least
some of) the problems caused by the financial sector and the aftershocks.
What is the relation between public opinion and the welfare state? The
literature comprises two distinct theoretical and conflicting empirical findings.
One is that public opinion in certain contexts affects policy decisions (e.g.
Brooks and Manza 2006a, 2007; Burstein 1998, 2003; Christian 2008; Ken-
worthy 2009; Manza and Cook 2002; Svallfors 2003), while the other is that
government policy and a welfare state’s institutional setup shape public
opinion (e.g. Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Jaeger 2009; Jakobsen 2010;
Larsen 2008; Matthews and Erickson 2008; Sihvo and Uusitalo 1995). Both
mechanisms can bolster support for the welfare state in the wake of the
financial crisis. If public opinion is supportive of the welfare state, this
increases welfare-friendly policies through the first mechanism. Through the
second mechanism, the policies in place increase their own support when
needed most, such as in the current crisis. Together, these two mechanisms
work against dramatic scaling back of the welfare state.
An important issue is thus whether or not the current crisis is undermining
public support for the welfare state. Obviously, it is difficult to obtain con-
temporary data. The data we could find through our content analysis (see note
1), however, reveal that there is continuing support for the welfare state in
spite of the mounting financial constraints that limit the extent to which
governments can meet such demands. In fact, we found indications that voters
cherish the welfare state even more because of the crisis, because it does
precisely what it was supposed to do: shields people from losing their jobs or
protects their income in the case of unemployment.
Between the liberal regime countries, the USA and the UK, there is some
degree of divergence in public outlook. While a late 2009 Ipsos-MORI poll in
the UK showed that voters there were not ready for spending cuts, Gallup
polls indicate that a slight majority of Americans accept the need for tempo-
rary government expansion, but that a very large majority want it wound back
either immediately or as soon as the crisis is resolved (Ipsos-MORI 2009;
Gallup 2009a, 2009b).
From the literature and our analysis, we can present some tentative con-
clusions. First, it seems that the crisis and its aftershocks are likely to increase
rather than decrease public support for welfare provision (Blekesaune and
Quadagno 2003), making radical welfare state reform even more difficult.
Second, social policy remains a salient issue that the public will have relatively
clear and coherent views on, as a result of which public opinion will continue
to influence government policy-making and action (Burstein 1998). Third,
governments are likely to respond with increased support for the welfare state
where possible (Brooks and Manza 2006b). Quite clearly, a pro-welfare state
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rhetoric is dominating, in spite of frequently expressed worries about the need
to balance the budget. We infer that in the near future many political systems
are likely to experience an increased political tension between the popular
demand to uphold welfare arrangements and the financial and economic
demands to balance the budget. It is likely that activation and maximization
of labour market participation (including, for instance, an extension of the
pension age) are elements of the solution promoted in the wake of the crisis.
Contrary to Brooks and Manza (2007), we expect domain-specific trade-offs
to occur where specific domains receive extra support at the expense of
less-salient domains, in spite of the fact that increases in aggregate welfare
state effort or in welfare state generosity are limited because of budgetary
constraints.
If we look at the Ipsos-MORI polls, for instance, we observe that the UK
public is willing to accept government spending cuts, but refuses to accept cuts
on health care.2 A more recent Financial Times/Harris Poll (2010) supports this
result. Only 8 per cent of Britons think that health care should bear the biggest
part of the spending cuts burden.3 Interestingly, the same poll shows that a
little over 50 per cent of Britons consider it acceptable that unemployment
benefits get cut the most. In this respect, the UK differs radically from the
USA, where only 22 per cent considers this the best policy to cut, which is
about the same level as in Germany (and France, Italy and Spain). Another
interesting finding is that around 70 per cent of the respondents in the USA,
the UK, Germany (and France, Italy and Spain) agree with the statement that
‘the large budget deficits and the spending cuts that have happened or been
proposed call for a re-examination of Europe’s welfare states’. Unfortunately,
the poll does not provide any information about what this re-examination
should look like.
We conclude that the welfare state is still cherished as a major protection
against the impact of financial and economic shocks. However, it may be that
the public holds contradictory views that – from a public policy point of view
– are hard to square: the expensive welfare state is heartily supported, but so
are cuts in government spending.
Similar Problems?
To what extent do Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK,
and the USA face similar problems as a result of the financial crises and its
aftershocks? An important indicator for the state of the economy is the level
and change in unemployment. Figure 1 displays the development of the har-
monized unemployment rates in these six countries from the first quarter in
2008 to the second quarter of 2010. Whilst in Sweden, the UK and the USA,
the unemployment level was on the rise for the entire period, the increase was
particularly sharp from the third quarter of 2008 (Q308) onwards. This is also
when unemployment starts to increase in Denmark, in fact almost doubling
between Q308 and Q309 from 3.3 per cent to 6.2 per cent. In the Nether-
lands, unemployment levels had risen as of Q409, although less than in the
other countries (except Germany). Germany is the outlier in terms of unem-
ployment, because the level does not rise throughout the period. However,
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with 7.6 per cent unemployment, Germany had the poorest performance in
terms of unemployment of these six countries anyway. By Q409 this was no
longer the case: the USA (10 per cent) had taken over this position, trailed by
Sweden (8.9 per cent). Despite the differences between the countries, these
figures show that unemployment is clearly a problem in all of our countries.
The surge in unemployment is a symptom of interlinked problems that all
countries face. The banking sector in developed democracies has serious
credibility and stability problems, with many banks requiring very large sums
of capital injections. The Swedish government has spent the least of our six
cases, namely €5 billion (about 1.5 per cent of GDP). Compared to those of the
other countries, the Swedish banks have been less eager to take this money
because of the greater conditionality attached. The latter is a result of the
banking crisis that Sweden faced in the early 1990s (see e.g. Englund 1999). In
terms of sheer numbers the Danish government is next in line, with two
rounds of capital injections totaling around €18 billion (about 8 per cent of
GDP). In addition, the government has come to the rescue of two of Den-
mark’s (albeit relatively small) banks. The situation is similar in the Nether-
lands, where the government has spent about €20 billion to take over a bank
and another €20 billion on capital injections (about 7 per cent of GDP). The
German figures are substantially higher: in December 2008, the German
Parliament approved capital injections of €480 billion (about 20 per cent of
GDP). The American response resembles that of Germany in terms of the
absolute level of spending, with capital injections amounting to US$700 billion
(€519 billion) (about 5 per cent of GDP). The UK, finally, tops this figure, with
Figure 1
Development of harmonized unemployment rates
Source: OECD 2010.
Note: Unemployment rates adjusted for seasonal variation; entries are the 1st quarter of 2008,
the 2nd quarter of 2008, etc.
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£850 billion (€960 billion) of expenditure (about 60 per cent of GDP).
Although the exact figures vary across the six cases, the trend indicates that
the banking sector in each country required massive government assistance to
survive the crisis.
Unemployment has been rising also because of falling exports, among other
things caused by lower consumer confidence. Figure 2 displays the develop-
ment of exports in goods (value) in billions of US dollars in our six countries
from the final quarter of 2008 to January 2010. Exports fell everywhere
between Q408 and Q109. The highest reduction took place in Sweden (minus
15.9 per cent), trailed by the UK (minus 15 per cent), the USA (minus 14.3 per
cent) and, at some distance, the Netherlands (minus 12.9), Germany (minus
10.7 per cent), and Denmark (minus 8.7 per cent). In most countries, exports
picked up after the first quarter of 2009, but not in Germany (another 2 per
cent reduction) and the USA (minus 1.3 per cent). Between the second and
fourth quarters of 2009, all countries saw their exports increase again – in
most cases to levels higher than Q408 – yet in Denmark (minus 5.1 per cent),
Germany (minus 4.5 per cent), and the UK (minus 6 per cent) exports fell
again between the Q409 and January 2010.
But we live in volatile times. The International Monetary Fund (2010: 75,
see also Statistisches Bundesamst Deutschland 2010) has recently predicted
that, after a decline of real GDP in 2009 of 4.7 per cent, the German economy
is expected to grow by a high 3.3 per cent in 2010 (although unemployment is
expected to remain around 7 per cent). Overall, however, the data on unem-
ployment, the banking sector, and exports show that our six countries largely
deal with similar problems. Did these similar problems evoke similar initial
responses?
Figure 2
Exports in goods (value), in 2005 billions of US dollars
Source: OECD 2010.
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Similar (Initial) Responses?
Which measures have the American, British, Danish, Dutch, German and
Swedish governments taken to cope with the adverse effects of the crisis?
Apart from the emergency support for the financial sector characterizing the
first crisis response phase, it is difficult to get data on policy adjustments or
new policy initiatives taken in the various countries, because many proposals
are still being developed or are under debate. In order to get at least some idea
of what has been going on, we have been collecting data from various sources
(see note 1). Table 1 summarizes the measures taken in the first and second
phases of the response to the financial crisis and its economic aftershocks, as
we found them in our qualitative content analysis. We subsume the measures
under four categories: (1) Keynesian measures (investing in jobs, investing in
infrastructure, tax measures, and tax relief); (2) monetary policy (lowering
interest rates, money creation, buying government bonds); (3) circumventing
bankruptcy (creation of ‘bad’ banks, guarantees on problem assets, financial
support to banks or companies, take-over of banks, liquidity fund for banks);
and (4) re-establishing trust in the banking sector (guarantees on savings,
guarantees of inter-bank lending, and increase of supervision).
Table 1
Summary of crisis measures taken
USA NL UK DE DK SW
Keynesian measures
Investing in jobs X X X X X X
Investing in infrastructure X
Tax measures X X
Tax relief X X
Monetary policy
Lowering interest rate X X X X X X
Money creation X
Buying government bonds X
Circumventing bankruptcy
Bad bank (crisis bank) X X X X
Guarantees on problem assets X
Financial support to banks or companies X X X X X X
Take-over of banks X X
Liquidity fund for banks X
Re-establishing trust in banking sector
Guarantees on savings (or increases its level) X X X X
Guarantees for interbank lending X
Increase of supervision X
Note: An X in the table indicates that one or more measures were taken that fall under a
specific category (such as investing in jobs). To assess whether a particular measure was taken,
we conducted a qualitative content analysis of written and (online) media sources (see note 1).
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If we look at the indicators falling under the heading of ‘circumventing
bankruptcy’ and ‘re-establishing trust’ in table 1, we observe similar responses.
If our data are correct, Germany is a special case because in this country
a Keynesian type of response seems to have been most systematically
formulated.
Our content analysis reveals that in the second response phase the labour
market is the area to which most attention has been directed and where
policy-making initiatives have been most frequent (and most frequently dis-
cussed). Still, the need for more general welfare state reform (and major
restructuring) in the fields of health, education, housing and pensions, con-
tinues to be a hot issue too. Specifically, our analysis indicates that, next to the
direct financial predicament, rising unemployment (or the expectation that
jobs will be lost) is by far the greatest worry of all governments. If anywhere,
we expect major adjustments in labour market related policies in the wake of
the financial crisis. Table 2 summarizes the recent data on this.
If we examine the details of the measures taken, the UK stands out.
Although the UK had the lowest score on supportive policies of all EU 15
countries before the crisis, the government has been very reluctant to improve
these policies, even temporarily (Clegg 2010). The main measures taken in the
UK fall under the heading of active labour market policies. As of January 2009
there is extra support for jobseekers who have been unemployed for more
than six months, additional funding for the public employment office ( Job-
centre Plus), a bonus of up to £2,500 (€3,000) for employers to hire and train
an unemployed person, new training places, work-focused volunteering
options, and help to establish a business. The total costs of these measures
amount to approximately £0.5 billion (€553 million). Furthermore, the
Table 2
Labour market related measures
USA NL UK DE DK SW
Labour demand measures
Job subsidies, recruitment incentives, public job creation X X
Reductions in non-wage labour costs X X
Short-time working schemes X X X
Measures to help the unemployed find work
Activation requirements X X
Job search assistance and matching X X X X X
Job finding and business startup incentives X
Work experience programmes X X X
Training programmes X X X X X X
Sources: Clegg 2010: Table 1 (Compiled from Glassner and Galgóczi (2009); European
Employment Observatory (2009); European Monitoring Centre on Change, http://www.
eurofound.europa.eu/emcc/index.htm (accessed April 2010); Mandl and Salvatore 2009:
12–13; OECD 2009: 3, Table 1.
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government has committed to another £1.3 billion (€1.4 billion, about 0.1 per
cent of GDP) so that those individuals who become unemployed can receive
their benefit more quickly (EEO 2009: 15–16). In a comparative perspective,
these measures are not that substantial. Overall, the UK’s approach to tack-
ling the crisis has been characterized mostly by tax cuts in an attempt to boost
economic activity (Clegg 2010). Conversely, nothing has been done to address
those who are becoming unemployed – a feature in which the UK differs
substantially from the rest of Western Europe. Partial unemployment is
perhaps the most important of these. In Germany, there was already a partial
unemployment scheme in place – in the form of structurally lower working
time – which has been extended from 6 to 18 months (‘stimulus package 1’)
and has been extended further after that. Also the contribution from the
government has been increased (Clegg 2010).
Table 2 indicates that most countries, although not in all specific fields and
to the same extent, have formulated new or updated existing measures in the
area of both active and passive labour market policies. Our data also indicate
that in all countries cuts in core functions have not been made, at least not yet.
However, we are picking up the contours of a third phase in the response to
the financial crisis and its aftershocks. It seems that a general acceptance has
emerged that cuts need to be made in the long term, but political actors have
avoided discussing exactly how, where, and when such cuts will have to occur.
During the 2010 election campaign the main political parties in the UK, for
instance, were not very specific with numbers on planned cuts. The new
coalition government (Conservatives and Liberal Democrats) adopted a plan
for £30 billion spending cuts (about 1.8 per cent of GDP) in its June 2010
Budget. Proposed measures include an increase in the VAT tax by 2.5 per
cent (to 20 per cent) and a spending reduction of 25 per cent over the next four
years for all civil service departments, except health and overseas aid. Welfare
spending will be cut by £11 billion (about €13 billion, 0.8 per cent of GDP)
over the next five years. Child benefits will be frozen, family tax credit will be
reduced, housing benefits will be capped, medicals for disability benefits will
be stricter, and the increase of the state pension age from 65 to 66 will be
accelerated (European Institute 2010). Total spending cuts by 2014–15 will
amount to £81 billion (€90.7 billion, 5.6 per cent of GDP) (HM Treasury
2010). These proposed cuts will, among other things, further hit welfare and
public service pensions (as well as environmental levies). Additionally, the
government will ‘radically change the welfare system’ (HMTreasury 2010: 28)
by replacing the current system of means tested working age benefits with a
new Universal Credit that would enable work to always pay. Simultaneously,
the government will reduce fraud and error through a new approach
and implement a Work Programme for those with the largest distance to
employment.
The German government also appears to be committed to meeting tough
deficit targets. In July 2010 the German government agreed on significant
cutbacks in a savings plan (Sparprogramm), amounting to approximately
€80 billion between 2011 and 2014 (about 3 per cent of GDP). The package is
a mixture of cancellation of existing subsidies, higher taxation, a major reform
of the army, public administration reforms, reform of the financial sector, and
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several – taken on their own – relatively minor benefit cuts and entitlement
restrictions (Bundesregierung 2010). At the same time, the savings package
reserves €12 billion to invest in education, research and development.
In the Netherlands the exact cutbacks and their timing dominated the
electoral campaign of Spring 2010, and they were a crucial part of the
negotiations on the new coalition government. Cutbacks are projected to be
around €18 billion (about 3 per cent of GDP). The aim of the new government
is to restore a balanced budget in 2015. Proposed measures concern modest to
considerable retrenchments across various sectors, including health, pensions
(a gradual increase of the retirement age), child care, disability and social
assistance. The Danes face spending cuts of a, for them, draconian size of
€3.2 billion (almost 1.5 per cent of GDP). Proposed measures involve the
(further) reduction of the unemployment benefit from four to two years,
20,000 less jobs in the public sector and a 5 per cent reduction of child benefits.
Sweden is the only one of our six countries where severe cutbacks in public
spending are not expected. This is because Sweden benefits from the strict
fiscal rules implemented in the 1990s (European Institute 2010).
Conclusion
We have highlighted the financial, economic and social policy responses to the
financial crisis of 2008–09 in six key advanced welfare states. To answer our
title’s question: the crisis intensified the pressure to reform the welfare state
reform to some extent, but, to date, the various pressures have not translated
into drastic welfare state reform. The responses hereby fail to confirm the
expectations of any theory of welfare state change, in which political actors are
expected to take up the opportunity to implement substantial reforms. Gov-
ernments have first jumped to the rescue of the financial sector and then
introduced measures to stimulate demand, at the cost of a balanced budget.
The initial response has been compensation rather than efficiency and has
occurred irrespective of the political leaning of the ruling parties.
During the crisis and its aftershocks, the welfare state appeared a crucial
institution protecting people from ill fortunes beyond their control. The
welfare state’s core programmes therefore remain popular and – under the
extreme conditions of the financial crisis – are still broadly supported. This
continued public support for the welfare state is proving to be quite robust,
especially now that the financial crisis is not in any fundamental sense blamed
on, for instance, expensive social policy as the 1980s crisis was. The welfare
state, then, is typically included in the political solutions to the crisis. The data
on public opinion and on policy developments in the UK, the USA,
Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden also reveal the public’s
continued support for and trust in the welfare state.
In addition, the common problems faced – including rising unemployment,
reduced credibility of the banking sector and falling exports – help to explain
the common reactions across the board. However, the immediate response has
been a costly affair andwe find an indication that we have entered a third phase
in the response to the crises. Labour market policy and banking reform have
clearly received the most attention in the first phase, but measures have also
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been taken or are being considered in other policy areas, such as pensions and
housing, announcing the arrival of a more austere period to restore balanced
budgets. The theme that runs throughout is that spending has been, albeit
temporarily, increased in key areas, as governments try to support those who
have been adversely affected by the crisis. However, a broadly shared political
conviction is developing, that the costly initial response is not sustainable in the
long run, because it is causing deficit spending to rise dramatically.
The current, third, phase is characterized by an emerging political agree-
ment that deficit spending is rapidly approaching its limits. Consequently, it is
likely that the politics of reform will now quickly revolve around the question
who pays what, when, and how, or in other words, who will have to carry the
heavy burden of financial and economic recovery. The crucial political issues
are if a swift return to a balanced budget is a conditio sine qua non for economic
recovery and, if so, whether drastic retrenchment or a substantial increase in
taxes is the key. Governments in some of our countries (especially the UK,
Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands) have already agreed on significant
public spending cuts that may or may not add up to drastic reforms and induce
new distributional conflicts. Such decisionsmight spark public resistance like in
Greece, because the crisis has also bolstered public support for thewelfare state.
Public opinion will remain an important factor in determining the timing,
extent, and pace of social spending cuts. In addition, the well-known resilience
mechanisms of long- and well-established social programmes will be automati-
cally triggered by such measures, making outcomes uncertain.
We conclude that there has not been a major onslaught against the welfare
state in the immediate wake of the financial crisis. It seems, however, that
more drastic spending cuts are envisaged, although for a variety of political
and institutional reasons there will probably be a considerable gap between
intentions and achievements. Pressures that impel radical reform have gained
further strength, but the welfare state is simply not that easily toppled. This,
however, does not imply that there has been no welfare state reform or
change. On the contrary, during the last 20 years or so welfare states have
been continually adjusted to new economic and social demands, and govern-
ments have pursued, albeit with considerable variation, well-adapted and
innovative social investment policies. Whether such social investment strate-
gies will become victims of the pending distributional battles or be part of a
new positive-sum solution to the perpetual equality–efficiency trade-offs is a
question that will dominate the political and research agendas alike in the next
decade.
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Notes
1. We conducted the qualitative content analysis between October 2009 and August
2010, using search functions on the websites of: LexisNexis, the Economist, OECD,
ICPSR and Google News. LexisNexis search sources included: Major U.S. and
World Publications, News Wire Services, TV and Radio Broadcast Transcripts,
and Web Publications. Search terms used: ‘public opinion’, ‘welfare state’, ‘social
policy’, reform, change, amendment, initiative, development, economic, crisis,
‘credit crunch’, Germany, US, USA, ‘United States’, America, UK, ‘Great
Britain’, ‘United Kingdom’, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands. All results are
limited to January 2008 and later.
2. The plans announced in the Spending Review 2010 of the UK HM Treasury in
October 2010 indicates that the government is responsive to the British voters on
this point; with all departments facing spending cuts of about 19 per cent, health is
(with overseas aid) the only area that will not be facing such drastic cutbacks (HM
Treasury 2010).
3. This analysis is indicative of the measures taken as well as of public opinion. Still,
given that we are dealing with a moving target about which systematic data are
unavailable (yet), this is the best we can do. See note 1 for information on the
content analysis.
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